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Who should Own Rights of Service 
Invention, Employees or Firms?  
 
Abstract 
Who should own patent rights of new technologies discovered in the 
workplaces, firms or researchers? We use a multitask moral hazard model to consider 
the effect of ownership and regulations on service invention to social welfare. When 
employees own all rights of invention, they face excess incentive schemes, and thus 
inefficient risk sharing is realized. Moreover, employees are willing to pay much 
attention into what they like. Employees' ownership leads to distortion of their behavior. 
In contrast, in the case of firms' ownership, these distortions disappear, and thereby it is 
desirable that all rights of invention belong to firms. On the other hand, when the value 
of new technologies is difficult to measure, it can be better that rights of them belong to 
employees. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: K11, K12 
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1. Introduction 
 
      Firms devote much resource into R&D activities and employ researchers for 
invention. Employed researchers use the firms' resources like funds, items, and 
technologies to invent new technologies. Invention of new technologies by employed 
researchers who are hired for invention is called service invention. Firms' resources and 
employees' idea and efforts are necessary for service invention, however, there is a 
problem. Who should own the patent rights of new technologies, firms or researchers? 
We consider the effect of ownership and regulations on service invention to social 
welfare in this paper. 
    Recently, in Japan, some employed researchers who developed new technologies in 
their firms sue their firms for damages. They request the firms to provide much amount 
of payment. Employed researchers often complain of the firms' policy on compensation 
of service invention. In Japan, as a rule, patent rights of new technologies belong to 
employees in the case of service invention. Even when firms and employees make 
contracts that patent rights of new technologies developed in the firms belong to the 
firms, the firms must provide reasonable consideration as compensation of service 
invention to the employees. Even if firms and employees specify in the contracts that 
firms do not have to pay anything on service invention, the contracts like these are not 
accepted in court. When employees go to trial and request firms to provide reasonable 
consideration, firms must pay it after invention. This is a forcible provision in patent 
law in Japan. The forcible provision on service invention implies that the right of new 
technologies belongs to employees. 
    The matter on the forcible provision on service invention leads to annoyance in the 
actual business world. Recently, professor Shuji Nakamura in the University of 
California Santa Barbara sues his primary company Nichia Corporation and insists that 
the ownership of the patent of Blue LED (light-emitting diode) should belong to himself 
and he has the right to receive reasonable consideration as compensation of invention of 
Blue LED even if the ownership belongs to Nichia Corporation. Blue LED is useful 
technology for many industries and yields huge profit of thousands or hundreds billion 
yen.1  
                                                  
1 There are the light's three primary colors: red, green, and blue. Since Red and Green LED had 
been developed previously, many researchers had tried to develop the last color, Blue LED. 
Professor Isamu Akasaki in Meijyo University first succeeded in the development of Blue LED and 
Professor Nakamura improved the quality of Blue LED. Success of the development of Blue LED 
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Professor Nakamura succeeded in the development of the Blue LED when he 
was employed by Nichia corporation. Professor Nakamura insists that all rights of Blue 
LED belong to himself and that the consideration he actually got was very small. A lot 
of attention is paid to professor Nakamura's trial and we observe different views on who 
should own rights of new technologies in service invention. Some journalists indicate 
that firms must provide much consideration as compensation of service invention 
because wage of engineers and researchers is comparatively lower than that of white 
collar workers. Other law researchers declare that employees should be protected since 
they are weaker than firms, and thus they insist that ownership of rights of service 
invention should belong to employees. On the other hand, firm managers state not only 
that employees are sufficiently compensated from the viewpoint of increase of wage and 
promotion but also that paper work to deal with service invention increases firms' costs. 
Hence, they require the Japanese patent law to be amended to delete the forcible 
provision on service invention and insist that firms and employees should be able to 
make contracts on service invention. This is a hot issue in Japan. 
In Germany and Japan, matters on service invention are specified in the patent 
law. In Japan, when matters on service invention are not specified in contracts between 
firms and employees, the right on the new technologies discovered in the workshops 
belongs to employees. In this situation, firms can get non-exclusive licenses: the firms 
can free use the new technologies discovered in the workplaces without paying the 
license fees to the employees who are the owners of the patents. The employees can 
make license contracts on the new technologies with other individuals and firms to get 
license fees. As we mention later, this is similar to the case of shop right invention in the 
United States. On the other hand, when it is specified in the contracts that the rights on 
new technologies is transferred to firms, the firms must provide reasonable 
consideration to the employees. The amount of reasonable consideration as 
compensation of the invention depends on the value of the invention. The amount on 
reasonable consideration of the invention is determined after success of the invention. If 
new technologies lead to high profit, the reasonable consideration is high. The firms can 
use the new technologies free and make license contracts on them with other firms to 
get license fees: exclusive licenses on the technologies are granted to firms. The 
employees cannot make license contracts with other firms in this situation because the 
                                                                                                                                                  
means that we complete the light's three primary colors and can use them for application in various 
fields ('Weekly Diamond' ('Syukan Diamond' in Japanese) pp.84-87 June 23, 2001).  
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right of new technologies is transferred to the firms, though, they receive reasonable 
consideration as compensation of invention. This is the Japanese rule: ownership of new 
technologies as service invention belongs to employees. When ownership is transferred 
to firms, employees have the right to receive reasonable consideration. According to 
Takeda (2002), German system on service invention is similar to Japanese one. 
Foster and Shook (1989) mention that, in the United States, it is occasionally 
specified in employment contracts between firms and researchers on who owns patent 
rights on new technologies as service invention. When matters on service invention are 
not sufficiently specified in employment contracts, determinant on ownership of new 
technologies depends on characteristics of employment. If workers are hired for 
invention, new technologies are regarded as service invention and the rights of them 
belong to the firms. Firms get all rights of the technologies. Unless it is specified in the 
contracts that firms provide additional payment on the invention, the firms do not have 
to give reasonable consideration on the invention. This is contrary to Japan. In Japan, as 
we stated above, all rights of service invention belong to employees who are hired for 
invention. If rights of invention are transferred to firms, the firm must provide 
reasonable consideration to employees. They cannot make contracts on service 
invention in Japan, in other words, there is the forcible provision on service invention in 
patent law. 
 On the other hand, in the U.S., if workers are not hired for invention but 
succeed in developing new technologies by using firms' resources, the workers get 
patent rights of the new technologies, however, the firms get the non-exclusive license 
on them for free. Although the firms do not have the exclusive license, the firms use the 
new technologies in the firms' production and activities for free. This case is called shop 
right invention.  
We summarize the difference of rules of patent rights in table 1. In the U.S., 
firms and employees can make contracts on invention in the workplaces. Even if they 
do not make contracts on invention, firms own all rights of invention when employees 
are hired for invention. Employees have rights of invention only when they are not hired 
for invention and they do not specify in the contracts that rights of invention belong to 
the firms. In contrast, as we mentioned, rights of invention discovered in the workplaces 
belong to employees in Japan.  
In the U.K., there is the discipline that patent rights of new technologies as 
service invention belong to the firms. Compared with Japan and Germany, the U.S. and 
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the U.K. are the countries where rights on service invention belong to firms.2 Ohba 
(2002) raises many countries that have the patent policy on service invention similar to 
the U.S., for example, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. 
We consider the case that employed researchers develop new technologies as 
service invention in the workplaces. There are two ways that firms earn profit from new 
technologies by. One way is that the incumbent firms can use new technologies for their 
production and activities by themselves. This is a kind of specific use of new 
technologies. The incumbent firms make profit from the characteristic of the new 
technologies that they can use for their activities by themselves. We call the 
characteristic the (firm or industry) specific characteristic. The other way is that the 
firms get license fees by making license contracts with other firms. There is the other 
characteristic that the incumbent firms cannot or will not use new technologies by 
themselves because they do not know how to use it or the cost to use is huge. When 
other firms can use the characteristic, the incumbent firms make license contracts with 
the other ones to get license fees. This characteristic is called the non-specific 
characteristic in this paper.   
We can raise the pharmaceutical industry as an example of the non-specific 
characteristic of technologies. Pharmaceutical firms including global Mega-Pharmas 
rarely have all kinds of products for dozens of therapeutic area. They strategically focus 
on some therapeutic areas for their business scope. In the pharmaceutical R&D 
processes, researchers happen to discover new chemical compounds (origins of new 
drugs) different from their original targets. These new discoveries do not necessarily 
belong to the business areas of the incumbent firms. In the development process, 
various resources of the firms, for instance, special and professional knowledge specific 
for the therapeutic area and the networks with hospitals and doctors, are essential to 
implement commercialization of research achievements and product merchandising. 
However, the incumbent firms are unlikely to have sufficient resources and know-how 
to use new discoveries by themselves when new discoveries are outside of their 
business areas. In this situation, it is observed that the incumbent firms make license 
contracts on them with other firms.  
Even if ownership of new technologies belongs to employees, as we have 
indicated, the incumbent firms have free non-exclusive license. This is the Japanese 
                                                  
2 Recently, according to Takeda (2002), there is the trend that firms provide consideration as 
compensation of invention to employees in the U.K. and U.S., especially when the impact of 
invention is big. We need to observe the change of the trend carefully. 
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case and the case of the shop right invention in the U.S. Hence, the incumbent firm gets 
profit from the specific characteristic of the new technologies because they can use the 
new technologies for their production and activities. However, the incumbent firms 
cannot make license contracts with other firms, and thus the firms do not get any profit 
from the non-specific characteristic of the new technologies. In this situation, 
employees who are the owners of the new technologies can make license contracts and 
get profits. On the other hand, when the firms own all rights of new technologies, the 
firms get profit from both the specific and the non-specific characteristics. 
We consider two cases: the firm's ownership case and the employee's one (table 
2). When firms own rights of the new technologies, firms do not provide any 
consideration after the invention. This implies the U.S. case. Matters on service 
invention are specified in employment contracts, and thus firms do not have to provide 
any consideration as compensation of the invention after success of invention. It is 
sufficient for firms to pay the wage or prize specified in employment contracts. 
In the employees' ownership case, there are two cases to consider: one is the 
case that employees keep their own rights, and the other is that the rights of new 
technologies are transferred to the firms from the employees. 
Actually, these two cases are equivalent. Employees have no option to use new 
technologies by themselves although they can make license contracts with other firms to 
get license fees. Hence, employees get only license fees when they own the patent rights 
of new technologies. This is the scenario when employees keep the right of invention. 
On the other hand, when the right of invention is transferred to firms, firms are required 
to provide the reasonable consideration as compensation of the invention. If the 
reasonable consideration as compensation of service invention is equivalent to revenue 
from license contracts with other firms, the employees' reward are equivalent in both 
cases. Firms can get only profit from free non-exclusive license of the specific 
characteristic of new technologies, but cannot get any profit from the non-specific 
characteristic of new technologies, which is the origin of the employees' income. In 
summary, firms get profit from both characteristics of new technologies and employees 
get only wage in the firm's ownership case. In the employee's ownership case, firms get 
net profit only from the specific characteristic and employees get wage and license fee 
or the reasonable consideration of invention. 
We use the multitask contract model by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) to 
consider the problem. Our result is simple. When employed researchers own the rights 
of the new technologies, excess incentives are given to employees. R&D activities never 
escape from failures and risks. As the moral hazard theory is well known, the trade-off 
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relationship between incentives and risks exists. In the case of risk neutral firms and risk 
averse employees, it is efficient for the firms to bear any risk cost. When the firms own 
the rights of new technologies and do not have to provide the reasonable consideration 
after the invention, firms can design the (second best) optimal incentive schemes to 
employees. However, when employees have the rights of new technologies, this 
situation is the Japanese and German case, workers face excess incentive schemes. This 
is inefficient and cannot conduct the second best welfare. Hence, we conclude that the 
matters on service invention in Japanese patent law should be amended from the 
viewpoint of the trade-off relationship between employees' incentives and risk aversion: 
firms should have the rights of new technologies in the case of service invention.  
 There is another distortion in the case of the employee's ownership. The firm 
cannot observe not only how much amount of efforts the employed researcher makes 
but also which characteristics he pays much attention into. He is willing to devote his 
resources to what he likes. Actually, in the case of Blue LED, professor Nakamura 
mentioned that a plan on the development of Blue LED which he proposed has not been 
accepted by his managers. 3  We consider how the difference between the firms' 
ownership and the employees' one distorts the research behaviors. In the case of the 
employees' ownership, the firms can use the new technologies without paying any 
license fee. The employees cannot receive the license fee from the incumbent firms, 
however, they can get reward from the non-specific characteristic of new technologies 
by making license contracts with outside firms. Hence, the employees' ownership makes 
the employees pay more attention into developing the non-specific characteristic of new 
technologies. This kind of distortion disappears in the case of the firms' ownership. This 
is another reason that the firms' ownership is better than the employees' one in the case 
of service invention.  
 Moreover, we consider the case that firms and employees cannot make 
contracts contingent on the value of invention. In the real world, the firms' evaluation on 
new technologies is often different from the employees' evaluation on them. If a new 
technology produces effective value and profit, it can take long time to ascertain the 
actual value and profit produced by the new technology. Employees face the uncertain 
evaluation on new technologies. Firms are willing to under-evaluate them to decrease 
the compensation of service invention, however, employees have incentives of 
over-evaluation to get high payment. In this situation, it is difficult to make contracts 
based on the value of invention, and thus employees can be discouraged from making 
                                                  
3 Weekly Toyo-Keizai (in Japanese), p101 September 22, 2001 
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efforts for invention unless they own the patent right of new technologies. This is a kind 
of situation of contractual incompleteness. In this situation, it is difficult for firms to 
encourage employed researchers to develop new technologies, and thus rights of new 
technologies should belong to employees. Risk problem and behavior distortion are left, 
however, the ownership of rights of new technologies maintains the employees' 
incentives even if their incentives are excessively given. In the situation of contractual 
incompleteness, employee's ownership can be better than the firm's ownership. 
There are many studies on patent right from the viewpoint of designing optimal 
patent right. Researchers pay much attention to patent design and consider the optimal 
combination of protected range and period. For example, we can raise Klemperer (1990), 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001), and so on. However, few 
literatures on service invention exist. We apply the moral hazard theory to service 
invention, and then the results from our model are not sufficiently surprised from the 
theoretical viewpoints, however, it gives effective way on the recent hot issue on service 
invention. 
     
 
2. The Model 
 
A firm employs a worker for R&D activities. New technologies have two kinds 
of characteristics: one is the specific characteristic that the firm can use for its own 
activities like producing outputs and services, and the other is the non-specific 
characteristic that the firm cannot or will not use by themselves. The former 
characteristic is the firm or industry specific and yields some advantage to the firm in 
the competition. The latter one does not lead to advantage to the firm directly because 
the firm does not have appropriate options and know how to use it. However, the firm 
can get license fees by making license contracts with other firms. 
       There are two types of ownership of new technologies. We focus on the 
difference of between the firm's ownership and the employee's one of new technologies. 
     
1. The firms' ownership  
 
An employed researcher can devote his efforts or attention into two parts: the 
(firm or industry) specific characteristic and the non-specific one. His total efforts are 
denoted by s nµ = µ +µ , where subscript s means the specific characteristic and n does 
the non-specific one. Effort cost is given by c(µ), and effort cost function is strictly 
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convex: c′>0, c">0, c(0)=0, and 
0
lim ( ) 0c
µ→
µ = . New technologies yield revenue which 
depends on the worker's effort level and luck: s s s sR k= µ + ε  and µ εn n n nR k= + . 
( , )ik i s n=  implies the effectiveness of the characteristic of the new technology and 
ε ( , )i i s n=  means random shock following the normal distribution: 
2ε [0, σ ] ( , )i N i s n=∼ . ε s  and εn  are identically and independently distributed. The 
firm cannot observe the worker's effort level but revenue. Even if the employed 
researcher devotes no effort to the development of the specific (non-specific) 
characteristic, the development of specific (non-specific) one can be succeeded due to 
his luck. This setting means that R&D activities cannot escape from risk and 
uncertainty. 
       Worker's utility function is given by the exponential form: 
( )exp { (µ)}U w c= − − − , where w means wage. In this paper, it is assumed that absolute 
risk aversion is 1 for simplicity. Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), we 
consider the case of linear payment schemes. The firm offers a linear wage scheme to 
the worker: α α βs s n nw R R= + + . Thus, his expected utility is given by 
     
 
{ }( )
2 2 2
exp ( ) ( ) ( )
( )exp ( )
2
s n s n
s n
s s s n n n
EU w c d d
k k c
≡ − − − µ φ ε φ ε ε ε
  σ α +α= − − α µ +α µ +β− µ −    
∫∫
, 
 
where ( )iφ ε  is the density function of the normal distribution on ε ( , )i i s n= . 
Reservation utility is exp(0) 1U ≡ = − . Individual rationality is given by EU U≥ . 
Since the firm is willing to offer the minimum wage payment, individual rationality is 
binding on the equilibrium path:  
     
 
2 2 2σ (α α )α µ α µ β (µ) 0
2
s n
s s s n n nk k c
++ + − − = . 
 
Thus, the firm's expected profit is given by 
     
 
2 2 2σ (α α )Π µ µ (µ)
2
s n
s n s s n nR R w k k c
+= + − = + − − . 
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Given the linear wage scheme, the employee determines his effort allocation as follows: 
 
if α αs s n nk k≥ , 1µ ( ') (α ) µ 0s s s nc k and−= =                       ...(1) 
and 
  if α αs s n nk k< , 1µ 0 µ ( ') (α )s n n nand c k−= =                       ...(2) 
 
From symmetry, the firm is willing to encourage the employee to make efforts at more 
beneficial section. Hence, the firm offers as follows: 
     
 α 0n s nif k k= ≥  
and 
 α 0s s nif k k= < .  
 
In the case of s nk k≥ , the firm offers α 0n = , and thus µ 0n = . The firm minimizes 
risk premium on the non-specific characteristic of the new technology by offering 
α 0n = . In this case, the employee can face no risk on the development of the 
non-specific characteristic. Although the employee devotes no effort to the development 
of the non-specific characteristic: µ 0n = , the revenue that the firm gets from the 
non-specific characteristic can be positive or negative due to the existence of luck 
(random shock) εn  and the revenue belongs to the firm. This implies that invention 
often depends essentially on luck in the real world. When the firm makes the worker 
concentrate into the development of the specific characteristic by offering α 0n = , the 
firm's expected profit is given by 
     
 
2 2σ αΠ µ (µ )
2
s
s s s s s nk c under k k= − − ≥ . 
 
The firm offers the linear wage scheme to maximize the expected profit. The first order 
condition is 
     
 2 αΠ '(µ ) σ α 0
µ µ
s
s s s
s s
k c ∂∂ = − − =∂ ∂ .                                 ...(3) 
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Differentiating (1), 
     
 α " 0
µ
s
s s
d c
d k
= > .                                                ...(4) 
 
Substituting (4) into (3), it is obtained that 
     
 
12
*
2
σ "α α 1 1s s
s
c
k
− = ≡ + <  
.                                       ...(5) 
 
Hence, the expected profit of the firm is given by 
     
 
2 * 2
* * σ (α )Π µ (µ )
2
s
s s s s s nk c under k k= − − ≥ ,                        ...(6) 
 
where * 1 *µ ( ') (α )s s sc k
−≡ . The case of s nk k<  is similar to the case of s nk k≥ . 
 
2. The employees' ownership 
     
       If an employed researcher has the rights of new technologies, he can get 
revenue as license fees by making license contracts. In Japan and Germany, there is a 
principle of service invention. In the case of service invention, the employee who 
succeeded in the development of new technologies must provide the employer with 
non-exclusive license. The firm can use the new technology for its own activities like 
producing outputs and services for free, but cannot make license contracts with other 
firms. The employee can make license contracts with other firms. Under this situation, 
the firm can use only the specific characteristic of the new technology.  
We consider the case of the employee's ownership in this section. The firm gets 
only the revenue from the specific characteristic, but no license fee from the 
non-specific one. The employee gets the license fee since he owns the patent of the 
non-specific characteristic of the new technology. 
As we indicated in Introduction, the employee's ownership case involves the 
case that the firm must provide reasonable consideration as compensation of service 
invention when the all rights of service invention is transferred to the firm from the 
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employee. For example, in Japan and Germany, there is the forcible provision on 
reasonable consideration for service invention. Even if the firm and the worker make the 
contract to agree that all rights of new technologies are transferred to the firm, the firm 
must provide the reasonable consideration to the employee after the invention. The 
employee is unwilling to agree transfer of all rights of the new technology if the 
reasonable consideration is less than license fees on making license contracts. When the 
reasonable consideration is equivalent to income from the license fee, the forcible 
provision on service invention is regarded as the employee's ownership. 
    The firm cannot assign an incentive payment scheme to the revenue from the 
non-specific characteristic of the new technology because the employee has all rights of 
the technology. The firm can assign an incentive scheme only on the specific 
characteristic of the new technology: α βW W Ws sw R= + . Thus, the employee's utility in 
this case is given by exp {α β (µ )}W W W Ws s nU R R c = − − + + −  . Similarly, the expected 
utility is as follows: 
     
 
2 2σ ((α ) 1)exp α µ µ β (µ )
2
W
W W W W W W s
s s s n nEU k k c
  += − − + + − −    
, 
 
where upperscript W means the case of the employee's ownership. Since the firm must 
satisfy individual rationality: WEU U≥ , it holds that 
     
 
2 2σ ((α ) 1)α µ µ β (µ ) 0
2
W
W W W W W s
s s s n nk k c
++ + − − = .                    ...(7) 
 
The firm's expected profit in the case of the employee's ownership ΠW WSR w= −  is 
given by 
     
2 2σ ((α ) 1)Π µ µ (µ )
2
W
W W W W s
s s n nk k c
+= + − − .                         ...(8) 
 
Now, we consider the employee's behavior. The employee is willing to devote his all 
efforts into more beneficial development. If αWs s nk k≥  holds on the equilibrium path, 
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marginal income the worker gets is higher in the development of the specific 
characteristic of technologies than in the development of the non-specific one, vice 
versa. Thus, in the case of αWs s nk k≥ , it holds that 
     
 ( )1µ ( ') α µ 0W W Ws s s nc k and−= = .                                ...(9) 
 
On the other hand, in the case of αWs s nk k< , it holds that 
     
( )1µ ( ') µ 0W Wn n sc k and−= = .                                  ...(10) 
 
When the firm encourages the employee to devote his all efforts into the development of 
the non-specific characteristic of technologies, the firm is willing to offer α 0Ws = . In 
this case, α 0Ws =  is optimal since it minimizes the risk premium. Hence, the firm's 
expected profit is given by 
 
2σΠ β µ (µ )
2
W W W W
n n n nk c= − = − − .                                 ...(11) 
 
In this model, the relative difference between ks and kn is crucial, and thereby we 
normalize kn to one: 1nk ≡ . Then, we analyze the effect of increase of ks. Clearly, ΠWn  
is independent of ks from (11). 
       Next, we consider the case wherein the firm makes the employee concentrate 
on the specific characteristic of technologies. The firm must offer more attractive wage 
scheme in the development of the specific characteristic of technologies than in the 
development of the non-specific one: 
     
 α 1Ws s nk k≥ ≡ .                                               ...(12) 
 
 14
It is a constraint the firm faces when the firm makes the employee pay all attention to 
the development of the specific characteristic of technologies.  
First, we consider the case such that (12) is not binding on the equilibrium. In 
this situation, the firm can offer payment schemes as if the constraint (12) does not exist, 
and thus the employee makes no effort in the development of the non-specific 
characteristic of technologies: µ 0Wn = . Thus, the firm's expected profit in this case is 
     
 
2 2
(12)
σ ((α ) 1)Π µ (µ )
2
W
W W W s
s s s sno
k c +≡ − − ,                          ...(13) 
 
where the expected profit without the constraint (12) is denoted as 
(12)
ΠWs no . Note that 
the employee faces the risk on the development of the non-specific characteristic of 
technologies even if µ 0Wn = . This risk is caused by the employee's patent ownership of 
new technologies. This is different from the case of the firm's ownership. As the similar 
manner to the case of the firm's ownership, 
     
 
12
*
2
σ "α α 1 1W Ws s
s
c
k
− = ≡ + <  
.                                    ...(14) 
      
From (5) and (14), it holds given ks that 
     
 * *α αWs s= .                                                   ...(15) 
 
The firm's profit is given by 
2 * 2
* *
(12)
σ ((α ) 1)Π µ (µ )
2
W
W W W s
s s s sno
k c +≡ − − , where 
* 1 *µ ( ') (α )W Ws s sc k
−≡ . When the constraint (12) is not binding, the following lemma is 
obtained. 
     
Lemma 1 
    *αWs  increases with respect to ks. 
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Proof is easy and in Appendix. The constraint (12) means that αWs  decreases with 
respect to ks. Using lemma 1, a critical point sk  exists such as the constraint (12) is not 
binding under s sk k>   and (12) is binding under s sk k≤  . See figure 1. 
       Since the constraint (12) is binding under s sk k≤  , the firm must offer 
1αWs
sk
=  in order to make the employee concentrate on the specific characteristic of 
technologies. In this case, from (9) and (10), it holds that 
     
 1µ ( ') (1)Ws c
−= .                                               ...(16) 
 
The firm's expected profit in this case is given by  
 
( ) 2 21 1 2α 1 σ σΠ ( ') (1) ( ') (1) 2 2Ws sWs sk sk c c c k− −= ≡ − − − .                     ...(17) 
 
When the constraint (12) is binding, the firm's expected profit is denoted as 
α 1
Π W
s s
W
s k = . 
Thus, figure 2 is obtained.45 The profit without the constraint (12) which is denoted as 
                                                  
4  Using the envelope theorem and (1), it holds that (12) *
Π
µ 0
W
s no W
s
s
d
dk
= > and 
2
*
(12)
2
Π µ 0
( )
W Ws no s
s s
d d
d k dk
= > . Also, it is obtained that
2
α 1 1
3
Π σ( ') (1) 0s s
W
s k
s s
d
c
dk k
= −= + >  from (16) and 
2
2
α 1
2 4
Π 3σ 0
( )
s s
W
s k
s s
d
d k k
= = − < . Thus, 
(12)
ΠWs no  is convex and α 1Π s s
W
s k =
 is concave with respect to ks. 
Next, we consider the curve of the firm's profit when the firm makes the employee pay his all 
attentions to the non-specific characteristic of technologies. In this case, ΠWn  is horizontal to ks 
because it is independent of ks from (11). Hence, figure 2 is obtained. 
5 In figure 2, we draw the case wherein sk  is less than ˆsk . The case of ˆs sk k≤   can happen, 
however, our results are not affected as we show later. 
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(12)
ΠWs no  is more than the profit with (12) given by α 1Π Ws s
W
s k = , and these are equal at the 
point of s sk k=  . Thus, when the firm makes the employee concentrate on the 
development of the specific characteristic of technologies, the expected profit is given 
as follows: 
     
 (12)
α 1
Π
Π
Π W
s s
W
s s snoW
s W
s s sk
if k k
if k k=
 ≥=  <

 .                                  ...(18) 
 
Hence, the expected profit ΠWs  increases with respect to ks. 
       Next, we consider the difference between ΠWs  and Π
W
n . 
     
Lemma 2 
A critical point ˆsk  exists: if ˆs sk k≥ , the firm makes the employee pay his all 
attention into the development of the specific characteristic of technologies rather than 
that of the non-specific characteristic, vice versa. The firm's expected profit is  
ˆΠ
Π
ˆΠ
W
s s sW
W
n s s
if k k
if k k
 ≥=  <
. The critical point ˆsk  is strictly more than 1: ˆ 1s nk k> ≡ . 
 
Proof is in Appendix. Lemma 2 indicates that the firm encourages the employee to 
devote his attention to the development of the specific characteristic of technologies 
when the specific characteristic of technologies is more beneficial than the non-specific 
one. Under ˆs sk k≥ , the firm encourages the employee to make his efforts into the 
development of the specific characteristic of technologies, otherwise, the firm makes the 
employee pay any attention into the development of the non-specific characteristic of 
technologies. The switching point ˆsk  between the specific and the non-specific 
characteristics is more than 1 in the case of the employee's ownership. In contrast, in the 
case of the firm's ownership, the switching point is equivalent to 1 and efficient. In the 
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case of the employee's ownership, the development of the non-specific characteristic of 
technologies is more attractive for the employee because he faces the outcomes of the 
development of the non-specific characteristic directly. Hence, the firm has to offer 
stronger incentive schemes to make the worker devote his efforts into the development 
of the specific characteristic of technologies. Excess incentive schemes lead to decline 
of the profit from the development of the specific characteristic of technology, and 
thereby the attractiveness of the specific characteristic must be large when the firm 
makes the employee concentrate his attention into the development of the specific 
characteristic of technologies. Unless attractiveness of the specific characteristics is 
sufficiently large, the firm is unwilling to encourage the employee to do research 
activities in the development of the specific characteristic. Therefore, the switching 
point between the specific and the non-specific characteristics is more than 1 in the case 
of the employee's ownership. 
 
Proposition 1 
[1] If ˆs sk k≥  and s sk k≥  , it holds that * *α α ( α )W Ws s s= = , 
( )( )* * 1 *µ µ µ ( ') αW Ws s s s sc k−= = ≡ , and µ 0Wn = . [2] If ˆs s sk k k≥ ≥ , it holds that 1αWs
sk
= , 
1µ ( ') (1)Ws c
−= , and µ 0Wn = . [3] If ˆs sk k< , it holds that α 0Ws = , µ 0Ws = , and 
1µ ( ') (1)Wn c
−= . 
 
Proof is easy. Case [1]: ˆs sk k≥  and s sk k≥  . Under ˆs sk k≥ , the firm makes the 
employee concentrate into the development of the specific characteristic of technologies. 
Thus, ( )* 1 *µ µ ( ') αWs s s sc k−= ≡  and µ 0Wn =  hold since (12) is not binding from s sk k≥  . 
The firm offers * *α α ( α )W Ws s s= =  from (15). 
Case [2]: ˆs s sk k k≥ ≥ . In the case of ˆs s sk k k≥ ≥ , (12) is binding although the 
firm has incentives of making the employee pay any attention into the development of 
the specific characteristic of technologies. Hence, it is obtained that 1αWs
sk
= , 
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1µ ( ') (1)Ws c
−= , and µ 0Wn = . 
Case [3]: ˆs sk k< . The firm is willing to make the employee concentrate into 
the development of the non-specific characteristic of technologies. It holds that α 0Ws = , 
µ 0Ws = , and 1µ ( ') (1)Wn c −= . 
Figure 3 shows which characteristics of technologies the employee pays his 
attention into. The non-specific characteristic of technologies is more likely to be 
developed in the employee's ownership case than in the firm's ownership one. 
 
Proposition 2 
The firm's profit in the case of the firm's ownership is more than that in the case of 
the employee's ownership: Π ΠW> . 
 
Proof is in Appendix. Reward from the non-specific characteristic of new technologies 
belongs to the employee in the employee's ownership. We can regard this case as the 
situation in which the firm faces a constraint on the incentive scheme of the non-specific 
characteristic of new technology: 1Wna = . In contrast, there is no constraint like this in 
the case of the firm's ownership. The case with the existence of the constraint is 
dominated by the case without the constraint. 
 There are two causes to obtain proposition 2. One is a risk problem. The risk 
problem is alleviated in the firm's ownership case because the firm can design the 
second best incentive scheme. In the employee's ownership case, the employee faces the 
excess incentive scheme, as a result, he is suffered from the risk problem. The other is 
the distortion on which characteristic the employee devotes his efforts and attention into. 
Distortion on the employee's attention appears in the employee's ownership case 
although it disappears in the firm's ownership. These two negative effects decrease the 
firm's profit in the employee's ownership case. Since the worker's expected utility is 
always equivalent to the level of the outside option U , Π ΠW>  indicates that the 
firm's ownership improves social welfare rather than the employee's ownership. 
     
     
3. Contractual Incompleteness 
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 In chapter 2, we have considered the situation that firms and employees can 
make contracts contingent on the value of new technologies. However, this kind of 
complete contract may be difficult to be enforced. The value of new technologies can be 
uncertain even after success of invention because it takes long time to fix the value. As 
the result, firms are willing to under-evaluate the value to decrease payment of 
invention, however, the employees have incentives of over-evaluation.  
 When it is difficult to make contracts based on the value of invention between 
firms and employees, firms cannot encourage employed researchers in the case of the 
firms' ownership. Hence, employees make no effort to invention: µ µ 0s n= = . The 
expected profit is zero in this case. 
 Under contractual incompleteness, the patents of service invention may belong 
to employees from the viewpoint of their incentives. When employees own the patent 
rights of invention, as we have shown in chapter 2, employees have incentives of 
invention. Unfortunately, risk and behavior distortion problem exist, and thus we cannot 
avoid these problems at all because we cannot make the second best contracts between 
firms and employees in this situation. However, we get positive expected profit and 
social welfare.  
 
 
4. Conclusions and Discussions 
 
We have considered the linear wage scheme case and shown that the firm's 
ownership of rights on service invention is more desirable than the employed 
researcher's ownership.6 In the case of the researcher's ownership, there are two types 
of distortions. One is inefficient risk sharing between the firm and the employee. 
Following the typical moral hazard model with a risk neutral principal and a risk averse 
agent, the employee's ownership case yields excess incentives to the employee. 
Moreover, since the development of the non-specific characteristic of technologies is 
more attractive for the employee, the employee is willing to pay his attention into the 
development of the non-specific characteristic of technologies. This is the other 
                                                  
6 Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), we used linear wage schemes under the random shock 
followed by normal distribution to consider the distortion of the employee's behavior. In the real 
world, discovery or invention might not be followed by normal distribution, however, our setting 
with linear payment schemes and normal distribution is simple and useful to analyze the behavior 
distortion of employed researchers. Even if the distribution is not normal, risk problem we consider 
is clearly left, and thus the firm's ownership is better than the employee's one. 
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distortion caused by the employee's ownership of rights on service invention. 
    Recently, we often observe opinions that employed researchers should be well 
treated by firms in Japan. However, in the case of service invention, it is inefficient to 
give the rights of new technologies in service invention to employed researchers. Our 
model in this paper is a typical multitask moral hazard model and gives few new results 
from the viewpoint of theoretical work, though, the model gives an effective viewpoint 
to service invention problems on who should have rights of new technologies in service 
invention. From our results, it can be myopic that employees should have any rights of 
service invention or receive reasonable consideration after invention, which is specified 
in Japanese patent law. 
 As we considered in chapter 3, contractual incompleteness modifies the result. 
When the value of invention is not fixed easily, firms cannot encourage employees to do 
R&D activities well by making incentive scheme contracts with employees. In this 
situation, the employees' ownership of rights of new technologies can yield incentives to 
employees although the incentive schemes the employees face are excessive.  
 We raise some cases wherein specification on the value of invention is difficult. 
First, the value of the invention is small, but the invention is necessary to develop 
next-generation technologies. The invention might be the first innovation essential to 
the second one with big value. Although the value of the first innovation may be small, 
it can yield huge profit in the future. As Scotchmer and Green (1990), Sctchmer (1996), 
Aoki and Prusa (1996), Denicolo (2000), and Choi (2002) consider, protection of early 
innovator is a crucial problem in the real world. Originally, studies on patent right focus 
on infringement of patent right and information disclosure on early innovation. The 
same problem exists in the case of service invention. 
Moreover, the value of new technologies does not appear clearly when firms 
use the new technologies to make cross-license contracts with other firms. Cross-license 
contracts allow a firm to use the other firm's technologies without paying any license 
fee each other. In this situation, the value of invention is not determined clearly 
although cross-license contracts are very often made to avoid the conflicts on the 
infringement of patent right. 
In these situations, it is difficult to measure the value of invention. It is an open 
question what situation measurement of the value is not only difficult but also crucial in. 
Recently, many Japanese firms introduce various types of incentive schemes on service 
invention to improve employees' incentives. From the empirical viewpoint, it is a future 
work to survey how these incentive schemes actually work for employees' incentives. 
 Finally, we point out the cost on making license contracts and managing patent 
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rights. Employed researchers can make license contracts with other outside firms at no 
cost in this paper. You will probably feel that this assumption is not realistic. Applying 
patents, making license contracts, and managing patents yield huge cost. There is scale 
merit of managing patents, and thereby the employee's ownership is dominated by the 
firm's one. Although we ignore the effect in this paper, we have shown that the firm's 
ownership is more desirable. Considering this effect strengthens our results. 
    
  
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of lemma 1 
   The first order condition of (13) is given by (12)
Π
0
µ
W
s no
W
s
∂
=∂ . Differentiate this 
condition with respect to µWs  and ks: 
 
 
2 2
(12) (12)
2
Π Π
µ 0
(µ ) µ
W W
s sno noW
s sW W
s s s
d dk
k
∂ ∂
+ =∂ ∂ ∂ . 
 
It holds that 
2
(12)
2
Π
0
(µ )
W
s no
W
s
∂
≤∂  from the second order condition and 
2
(12)
Π
1
µ
W
s no
W
s sk
∂
=∂ ∂ . 
Thus, 
 
 
2 2
(12) (12)
2
Π Π
0
(µ ) µµ
W W
s sno nos
W WW
s s ss
dk
kd
   ∂ ∂   = − ≥   ∂ ∂ ∂   
. 
 
This implies that µWs  increases with respect to ks. Using this result and (4), 
*αWs  
increases with respect to ks.■ 
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Proof of lemma 2 
ΠWs  increases with respect to ks and Π
W
n  is independent of ks. Since it holds from 
(17) that 
α 1
Π W
s s
W
s k = → −∞  as 0sk →  and ΠWs  is continuously increasing with respect 
to ks, there is a level of ˆsk such that ˆΠ ( ) Π
W W
s s nk = . Under 1 ( )s nk k= ≡ , it holds from 
(16) that 
2
(12)
σΠ Π 0
2
W W
n s no
− = > . As figure 2 implies, ˆ 1sk >  is obtained because 
(12) α 1
Π , Π W
s s
W W
s sno k = , and Π
W
s  increase with respect to ks.■ 
 
 
Proof of proposition 2 
First, we will show Π ΠWs s> . If the constraint (12) is not binding, from proposition 
1, * *α αWs s=  and * *µ µWs s=  holds. Using (6) and (13), it is obtained that 
2
(12)
σΠ Π 0
2
W
s s no
− = > . Next, we consider the case such that the constraint (12) is 
binding. Since the constraint (12) is binding, the expected profit is worse in this case 
than the case that (12) is not binding. Hence, it holds that 
(12) α 1
Π Π W
s s
W W
s sno k =≥  for any 
ks. This inequality strictly holds under s sk k≠  . Therefore, it holds from (18) that 
(12)
Π Π ΠW Ws s sno> ≥ . 
Next, we will show Π ΠWn n≥ . From symmetry and (6), when the firm makes 
the employee concentrate into the development of the non-specific characteristic of 
technologies, the expected profit in the case of the firm's ownership is given by 
 
 
2 2σ (α )Π µ (µ )
2
n
n n nc= − − .                                    ...(A1) 
 
The firm can optimize the incentive scheme αn . However, in the case of the employee's 
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ownership, the firm cannot optimize αn  since the employee owns the patent right of 
the technologies. This situation is similar to the case that the firm face a constraint: 
α 1Wn = . Since it holds that the optimal solution on (A1) is given by *α 1n <  from the 
similarity of (5), the existence of the constraint reduces the expected profit of the firm: 
Π ΠWn n> . 
It holds that { }Π max Π , Πs n=  and { }Π max Π , ΠW W Ws n= . From Π ΠWs s>  
and Π ΠWn n> , it is obtained that Π ΠW> .■ 
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Table 1 
 
Difference of rules of service invention 
 
 Employees' ownership (Japanese case) 
Firms' ownership 
(U.S. case) 
Firms' rights Free non-exclusive license All rights of invention 
Employees' rights Exclusive license Nothing 
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Table 2 
 
Origins of earnings in service invention 
 
 Employees' reward Firms' profit 
Firms' ownership Wage 
Profit from the specific 
characteristic       
and           
License reward on the 
non-specific characteristic
Employees' ownership
Wage          
and           
License reward on the 
non-specific characteristic 
Profit from the specific 
characteristic 
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